2. Expect mis- and disinformation to spike around these key dates.<\/strong> We can anticipate the typical shape of the harmful mis- and disinformation narratives that will likely be amplified during this period. Harmful narratives often fall into two buckets: election denial and candidate-specific. <\/p>\n\n\n\nElection denial narratives relate to election results and election administration issues and can include: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n- Claims that shifting vote tallies imply election fraud<\/strong>. Reminding people not to expect final election results on November 5 \u2013 and that vote totals, including who is leading, will change in the following days \u2013 is an important way to protect against the impact of voter fraud narratives. As election expert Rick Hasen pointed out last week<\/a>, however, there has been little coverage of the potential \u201cblue shift\u201d this year, or tendency for election results to change after Election Day as more ballots are counted. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Narratives that the election is rigged, including via voter fraud, election official misconduct, and other election administration barriers. <\/strong>False claims may resurface after Election Day to bolster narratives that the election was somehow unfair or illegitimate, especially in swing states or wherever there are tight races. The reality is that voting is secure<\/a> and fraud is rare<\/a>. Nevertheless, allegations that voting machines are changing votes \u2013 a claim that has circulated for many years \u2013 have already emerged<\/a>, as have claims (originating from a Russian influence operation) that election officials are ripping up ballots<\/a>. Other examples of old narratives that could be recycled after Election Day are unfounded complaints that secure elections do not have sufficient safeguards, as was claimed by proponents of the court-rejected Georgia hand-count rule;<\/a> conspiracies about natural disasters (for instance that the hurricane relief response in North Carolina and Georgia were designed to tilt the election);<\/a> claims that the election was stolen through legal channels (for instance by illegally suppressing votes<\/a> during legally mandated voter roll maintenance); and allegations of noncitizen voting<\/a>, including related to administrative errors in Arizona<\/a>. New claims about problems with election administration, such as whether certain ballots should or should not have been counted, would likely follow similar patterns.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- False and misleading narratives about the transition of power and the Electoral College. <\/strong>Claims that Presidential elections in the U.S. are rigged by the Electoral College are commonplace. In part, this is because in several recent elections, the winner of the electoral college did not win the popular vote. Narratives that the election could be overturned by faithless electors or that states may intentionally fail to meet statutory deadlines in order to submit a different slate of electors might also emerge. These coincide with claims that the deadlines for the transition to power could be intentionally delayed or altered, especially if the winner is of a different party than the incumbent. In addition to possible<\/a> attempts to interfere with the role of state electors or election certification<\/a>, mis- or disinformation about the process could further contribute to belief in electoral fraud and raise the risk of political violence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Candidate-specific narratives, meanwhile, support or detract from a candidate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n- Claims about plots against a candidate<\/strong> or narratives that otherwise paint them as a victim. <\/strong>So far this election cycle, popular narratives of this type include false claims<\/a> about the \u201cdeep state\u201d planning the Donald Trump assassination attempts and theories about an alleged third attempt<\/a> in October. Trump has also claimed that investigations by the Department of Justice, FBI, and state Attorneys Generals constitute a \u201cwitch hunt\u201d<\/a> despite no evidence of political motivation. During the post-election period, these sorts of narratives increase the chances that a candidate\u2019s supporters will violently defend them in the name of fighting an alleged injustice or attack, as happened on January 6 and is already being used as a mobilization tool among far right groups<\/a>. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Shocking allegations against a candidate. <\/strong>There have been numerous mis- and disinformation narratives in this category during the period ahead of Election Day. In one recent example, Tim Walz was falsely accused of sexual misconduct. The story and the video from the purported accuser were found to be part of a Russian influence operation<\/a>, and the video was artificially generated. While allegations during the voting period might be intended to influence voters\u2019 choices or turnout, claims of criminality or of acting against the interests of the American people could be used during the post-election period to argue that a candidate is legally unqualified to assume office. Such personal accusations create fodder for individuals, as well as organized groups and militias, that fashion themselves as \u201cpatriotic\u201d for purportedly defending laws that the system fails to enforce. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
3. Offline disruptions and online mis- and disinformation feed into each other.<\/strong> While it is difficult to prove the impact of influence operations on electoral outcomes, the overall mis- and disinformation environment has clear consequences for the election environment. For example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n- The information environment may fuel election violence<\/strong>. The Department of Homeland Security identifies<\/a> \u201cperceptions of voter fraud\u201d as the main risk for mobilizing election violence, and warned about potential ballot box arsons \u2013 which have since occurred<\/a> in the lead-up to November 5. As we saw in the lead-up to January 6, increased mis- and disinformation, especially about voter fraud, will raise the offline threat environment. Threats of violence against election workers<\/a> and polling places<\/a> can also cause fear among voters and disrupt normal election procedures. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Misinformation can interfere with election officials\u2019 ability to do their job.<\/strong> Earlier this month, the Oregon Secretary of State Elections Division temporarily stopped answering their phone line <\/a>because they were inundated with out-of-state calls, including threats, from people who saw false claims on social media. These are not the first interference attempts that we\u2019ve seen this year. Election officials have received violent threats<\/a>, ballot drop boxes have been set aflame<\/a> in three states, and white powder envelopes<\/a> have been sent to election offices in at least 16 states. Bad actors may seek to use claims of election fraud to mobilize support for attacks against election offices during the vote counting and certification process. As a result, election administrators have been preparing contingency plans should violent protests emerge this year; from setting up fencing perimeters<\/a> around counting facilities to stocking Narcan<\/a> for election workers if fentanyl is discovered in mail ballots. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":94631,"template":"","content_type":[7251],"area-of-focus":[10211,849],"class_list":["post-106162","insight","type-insight","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","content_type-blog","area-of-focus-election-disinformation","area-of-focus-elections-democracy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/insight\/106162","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/insight"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/insight"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/insight\/106162\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":106166,"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/insight\/106162\/revisions\/106166"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/94631"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=106162"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"content_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content_type?post=106162"},{"taxonomy":"area-of-focus","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdt.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/area-of-focus?post=106162"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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